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Abstract. The paper addresses the question, how environmental policy decisions
under uncertainty depend on the underlying welfare concept. We study three di®erent
welfare measures: The ¯rst is directly based on the ex ante (expected) utility of a
representative consumer whereas the second and the third are based on a valuation
of policy changes compared to the status quo. Here the second criterion is based on
the ex ante, the third on the ex post willingness-to-pay for policy changes with respect
to the status quo. We show that decisions based on these measures coincide if and
only if a risk neutral expected utility maximization is applied. Di®erences between
the decisions are analyzed for both, risk averse expected utility maximization and the
MaxiMin criterion. For risk-averse decision makers di®erences between the ¯rst and the
second concept arise if the absolute risk-aversion of the decision maker is not constant
in income. For risk aversion and the MaxiMin criterion, emission levels based on an
optimization of ex post utility changes, e.g. abatement costs, exceed those based on the
¯rst or second concept if a reduction of emissions is socially optimal. Implications for
applying the concepts of abatement costs and bene¯ts from abatement are discussed.
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Decisions are often to be made under uncertainty. The consequences of a decision may
depend on a state of nature whose realization is not known at the time the decision
is made. In particular the impact of environmental policy decisions is not perfectly
known in most cases because the a®ected ecosystems are too complex. In order to
make decisions in the context of risk or uncertainty usually the concept of expected
utility maximization is applied. To do this it is necessary, however, that probabilities
can be assigned to the states of nature. For the case that no such reliable probability
distribution exists, the MaxiMin criterion could be employed as an alternative, i.e.
the decision could be based on a valuation of the worst conceivable scenario. Not
surprisingly, optimal decisions depend crucially on the criterion taken.
To determine expected utility and for the valuation of the worst case scenario one has
to specify the welfare concept. Let us consider the problem of a decision on how much
emissions of a pollutant should be abated. In partial analysis two di®erent concepts can
be found in the literature: In some models one tries to maximize expected utility which
is often speci¯ed as expected bene¯ts from emissions less the environmental damage
from those emissions. In other models the expected increase of utility compared to
a reference scenario is maximized. This is often done by optimizing bene¯ts from
reducing emissions, i.e. avoided damage, minus the abatement costs. The abatement
costs are de¯ned as the loss of bene¯ts from emissions due to a reduction of emissions.
This second concept depends on a reference level, referred to as the status quo emission
level. Both concepts have been applied to environmental decisions under uncertainty.
For example, Ulph and Ulph [1997] employ the ¯rst concept, whereas Welsch
[1995] uses the second one. In both papers the authors assume that the direct economic
bene¯ts and costs of the decisions are certain, whereas the environmental consequences
depend on a state of nature that is unknown at the time the decision is made. Since
the two papers answer di®erent questions, the consequences of the choice of the welfare
concept cannot be compared directly. But, would we have to expect di®erences in
results that arise only because the underlying welfare concepts di®er? Are there reasons
to take the ¯rst approach in some models while in others the second concept is applied?
1In order to answer these questions, we will ¯rst motivate the two welfare concepts plus
a third one by applying decision criteria from the literature on the valuation of discrete
projects, i.e. decisions of \yes-or-no"-type. These criteria mostly refer to a measure
of the compensating variation. This willingness-to-pay can be determined ex ante, i.e.
before the uncertainty is resolved, or ex post, i.e. after the revelation of the true state
of nature.1 We then show that the three welfare measures coincide with respect to the
derived \optimal" decisions, if and only if a risk neutral expected utility maximization
is applied. For all other decision criteria optimal emission levels may vary due to the
choice of the welfare functional. Thus, a thorough assessment of which welfare measure
is the appropriate one is necessary before modeling questions in this context.
In this paper we analyze the impact of the choice of the welfare measure for risk-
averse expected utilility maximization and its extreme case, the MaxiMin criterion. In
particular we show that if a reduction of emissions is socially desirable, the optimal
emission levels based on a ex ante compensation measure are lower than those based
on the ex post measure, i.e. on the change in utility of a representative consumer. This
result holds true for non-risk-neutral expected utility maximization as well as for the
MaxiMin criterion.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our model. In section 3
we introduce and motivate the three di®erent welfare concepts. Section 4 shows that
in general equivalence of welfare measures is tantamount to a risk neutral decision
criterion. In section 5 decisions based on a risk averse expected utility maximization
are studied, in section 6 we look at the MaxiMin criterion. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We study a simple static model in which the impact of a political decision on the utility
of a representative consumer is uncertain. The consumer's utility can be measured in
terms of a composite commodity (money), denoted by z. The gross ex post utility of
the representative consumer depends on the government's decision on, say, an emission
1For a discussion of these measures the reader is referred to Bishop [1986] and Graham [1981].
2level e 2 IR. It is given by
u = U(e;s) ,
where s = 1;:::;S represents the state of nature which is unknown at the time the
decision is made. We assume that U is concave in e and twice di®erentiable, i.e.
Uee :=
@2U
@e2 < 0 .
This speci¯cation of ex post utility covers situations where production or consumption
of private goods results causes pollution. In case that the bene¯ts from consuming
that good (V ) and the environmental damage caused by the emissions (D) can be
monetarized separately, the utility function U could be written as
U(e;s) = V (e;s) ¡ D(e;s) .
Such an approach was taken by Ulph and Ulph [1997]. In their model V is concave
and does not depend on the state of nature s. D takes the special form D(e;s) = sd(e),
where d is a convex function.
We assume that the case where the government does not change its current policy
corresponds to the status quo, which we denote by e0. Further, there could be payments
to or by the consumer in order to compensate for losses or gains due to the policy
change. In this case, the net ex post utility zs in state s may di®er from the gross
utility level U(e;s). We assume that the consumer can rank di®erent net ex post
utility vectors, (zs)s = (z1;:::;zS), by an ex ante utility function W((zs)s). Realizing
the impact of his decisions on the utility of the consumer a regulator has to choose the
way, i.e. a welfare functional by which he ranks his decisions.
3 The di®erent welfare measures
In this section we describe three di®erent welfare measures which will be analyzed in
the following sections.
First, if the regulator knew the valuation by the consumer he could just rank decisions
3in exactly the same way. This leads to a welfare function
W1(e) = W((U(e;s))s) .
However, in most cases such a procedure is not feasible due to informational restrictions.
It may sometimes be easier for the regulator to assess the change in consumer's utility
due to a certain political action. In the literature on the valuation of policy options,
in those cases it is often referred to the contingent valuation method. This approach
bases on comparing two policies by asking people for their willingness-to-pay for or
their willingness-to-accept a policy change, respectively. In our model this woud result
in assessing a change from the status quo emission level e= to a new level e.2 This policy
change, however, may have di®erent impacts in di®erent states of nature. Therefore,
the ex ante willingness-to-pay (or compensating variation) generally di®ers from the
state dependent ex post willingness-to-pay for a change of the emission level from e0 to
e. The ex ante compensating variation, CV (e), in our model is implicitely determined
by
W((U(e;s) ¡ CV (e))s) = W((U(e
0;s))s) . 3
Based on this measure a policy change should be pursued if CV (e) > 0. Since when
deciding about the emission level there is not only one but a continuum of possible
emission levels, it may make sense to maximize the compensating variation. This leads
to a second welfare functional
W2(e) = CV (e) .
However, their is a discussion in the literature as to whether to aggregate ex ante or
ex post willingness-to-pay.4 In our model the ex post willingness-to-pay given a state
of nature s is given by
CV (e;s) = U(e;s) ¡ U(e
0;s) .
2See Hanley and Spash [1993] for an overview of the contingent valuation method.
3The measure of compensating variation often is referred to as option price, if the W(¢) is a expected
utility functional. Readers are referred to Ahlheim [1998], p.554.
4For a discussion see Graham [1981], Meier and Randall [1991], Ready [1995]. Ready gives
normative arguments for the ex ante measure, whereas he points at di±culties to determine this
measure.
4These ex post improvements in consumers well-being could be aggregated by the regu-
lator to a third welfare functional. Let us assume that the regulator assesses uncertain
ex post values in exactly the same way as the consumer does. Then we obtain:
W3(e) = W((CV (e;s))s) .
Note that the welfare measures W2 and W3 depend on the status quo emission level
e0. The welfare measure w1 is not a®ected by this reference scenario.
One could ask the question whether or not there is a natural welfare concept which
should be applied to ¯nd an \optimal" decision. Given a normative point of view the
¯rst criterion seems to be the most plausible one since if the consumer could make the
decision by himself, he would certainly maximize his ex ante expected utility. However,
if the regulator has no complete information about the consumers' preferences and can
only ask for changes in utility due to a certain decision, one of the last two measures
has to be applied.
In the literature that analyzes \optimal" emission levels on a theoretical basis, also dif-
fering welfare concepts are employed. Let us consider the special case from the previous
section where utility was given by the bene¯ts from emissions through the consumption
of a private good minus the environmental damage, U(e;s) = V (e;s)¡ D(e;s). Ulph
and Ulph [1997] directly take this utility as a welfare measure and thereby employ
the ¯rst welfare concept. Other authors, as for example Welsch [1995], try to eval-
uate abatement programs by maximizing the bene¯ts from the reduction of emissions
minus the abatement costs. Bene¯ts from the reduction thereby equal the abated en-
vironmental damage, D(e0:s)¡D(e;s). Abatement costs are a measure for the loss in
consumption compared to a reference scenario, i.e. V (e0;s)¡V (e;s). Welsch therefore
bases the analysis on the di®erence of utility levels, U(e;s) ¡ U(e0;s). Hence, such
an approach coincides with the third welfare measure where the utility U is de¯ned in
exactly the same way as in Ulph and Ulph [1997].
54 Equivalence of the welfare measures?
We now study in which cases decisions based on the di®erent welfare measures coincide,
and therefore a distinction of these measures is redundant. For a aggregation rule W(¢)
to lead to welfare measures W1 and W3 that imply identical decisions, for arbitrary









In order to show which properties of W this implies we use the following preliminary
result:
Lemma 1 Assume that a continuous monotone preference relation º de¯ned on IR
S
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The vector ¼ { given in lemma 1 { can be interpreted as a probability distribtution
over the states of nature s = 1;:::;S. Then x1 is preferred to x2 if the expected utility
of x1 exceeds that of x2. The proof of lemma 1 is delegated to the appendix.
Applying lemma 1 to the preference relation given by W(¢) we directly obtain the
following result:
Proposition 1 Let W(¢) : IR
S ! IR be continuous and monotone. Maximizing the
welfare measures W1, W2 and W3 based on W leads to identical decisions for any given
U(¢) if and only if W(¢) can be interpreted as risk neutral expected utility, i.e. can be
represented as W((zs)s) =
P
s ¼szs hat.
6The proof is given in the appendix. Thus, equivalence of the welfare measures can only
be expected if based on a risk neutral expected utility maximization. In particular,
this equivalence holds if there is no uncertainty, i.e. the state of nature s is perfectly
known. This case is illustrated in ¯gure 1. For alternative decision criteria, hoever,
the question arises, how the resulting decisions on the emission level di®er. This will
be analyzed in the following sections for risk averse expected utility maximization and
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Figure 1: The equivalence of the welfare measures under certainty
5 Risk averse expected utility maximization
Let us assume that decisions are based on a risk averse expected utility maximization




7where Á is a concave von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, i.e.
Á
0 > 0 ; Á
00 < 0 .












The second welfare functional W2(e) = CV (e) for risk-averse decision maker is im-
plicitely de¯ned by
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We denote the optimal emission levels by e¤1, e¤2, e¤3, respectively. To examine the
impact of the choice of the welfare concept on the optimal emission level we have to
compare e¤1, e¤2, and e¤3. Before doing this we will show the di®erent consequences
of risk-aversion depending on the criterion being employed. For this we assume that
utility U and marginal utility Ue := @U
@e decrease in s:
U(e;s) > U(e; ¹ s) and
Ue(e;s) > Ue(e; ¹ s) for s < ¹ s . (4)
8Thus, s can be interpreted as a damage parameter. The larger s, the smaller is the
utility derived by the representative consumer.5
Comparing the risk-averse emission levels e¤1, e¤2, e¤3 with the risk-neutral level, inthe
following denoted by e¤, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) Compared with optimal decisions under risk-neutrality, risk-
aversion leads to lower optimal emission levels if welfare measures W1 or W2 are em-
ployed, i.e. e¤1 < e¤ and e¤2 < e¤.
(ii) If risk-neutral welfare maximization implies a reduction of emissions with respect
to the status quo level e0, then the emission level e¤3 based on the ex post compensation
scheme exceeds the risk-neutral level, i.e. e¤3 > e¤. If an expansion of emissions is
optimal under risk-neutrality, i.e. e¤ > e0, then risk-aversion leads to less extended
emissions, i.e. e¤3 < e¤.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Proposition 2 states that for both, the ¯rst
and the second welfare concept, risk-aversion leads to lower optimal emission levels
compared to the risk-neutral case. This is a quite intuitive result since our assumption
that marginal utility decreases in s implies that the absolute value of the di®erence
between ex post welfare levels, U(e;s) ¡ U(e; ¹ s), increases with e. Hence, mitigation
of risk requires a reduction of emissions. For the last welfare criterion this is di®erent.
Here the risk stems from the uncertain changes of ex post utility levels if the emission
level is increased or decreased from the status quo emission level e0 to e. The risk
could be avoided completely by not deviating from the status quo. If a reduction of
emissions under risk-neutrality is optimal, a further reduction leads to a larger deviation
of the emission level from the status quo. Hence, additional risk would be generated.
Thus, risk aversion implies a smaller optimal reduction of emissions compared to the
optimal emission level under risk-neutrality. Di®erently, if e¤ exceeds e0, a reduction
of emissions from the risk-neutral level reduces the borne risk. In this case a smaller
expansion of emissions is optimal under risk-aversion. Hence, in both cases risk-aversion
leads to a smaller deviation from the status quo emission level.
5Assumption (4), although technical, is quite common in the literature. This speci¯cation of ex
post utility covers the example by Ulph and Ulph [1997] where U(e;s) = V (e) ¡ sd(e).
9After discussing the impact of risk-aversion on optimal decisions based on the di®erent
welfare concepts, we will now investigate the ordering of the optimal emission levels
e¤1, e¤2, and e¤3 for the three welfare measures under risk-aversion. We obtain the
following result:
Proposition 3 (i) If preferences satisfy decreasing absolute risk-aversion (DARA),
e¤1 > e¤2 holds. For increasing absolute risk-aversion (IARA) we get e¤1 < e¤2. If
preferences satisfy constant absolute risk-aversion, the decisions resulting from the ¯rst
and second welfare measure coincide.6
(ii) The optimal emission level based on the third welfare measure, e¤3, exceeds e¤1 and
e¤2 if the status quo emission level is larger than e¤1 or e¤2, respectively. If an expansion
of emissions is optimal for the ¯rst two welfare criteria, e¤3 can exceed or fall short of
e¤1 and e¤2.
The proof is delegated to the appendix. Proposition 3 shows that for a risk-averse
decision maker optimal decisions depend crucially on the choice of the welfare concept.
Let us assume { and this is certainly the relevant case { that the initial status quo
emission level exceeds both the optimal level based on the ¯rst and on the second
welfare criterion. Then less emissions have to be abated if the third welfare measure is
applied. The reason is again the di®erent source of risk. The involved risks are smaller
the closer the decision is to the status quo. Hence, for the third welfare criterion less
abatement activities lead to lower risk borne by the decision maker. The di®erences
between W1 and W2, however, are of di®erent nature. What is crucial here is how the
absolute risk aversion depends on income. If the absolute risk aversion is independent
of the income level, the optimal decisions coincide.
Decisions based on the third welfare measure generally di®er from those based on the
other two welfare concepts. In particular, applying the welfare concepts employed
by Ulph and Ulph [1997] and Welsch [1995], respectively, to exactly the same
problem would imply di®erent optimal decisions: An increased risk aversion would lead
6The measure of absolute risk aversion is de¯ned as ¡Á00=Á0. If this measure is a constant (in-
creasind, decreasing) function of U, the preferences show constant (increasing, decreasing) absolute
risk aversion.
10to stricter abatement of emissions for the Ulph and Ulph measure, whereas based on
Welsch's criterion less abatement would result. These di®erences can also be illustrated
for the MaxiMin criterion.
6 MaxiMin criterion
In this section we analyze the implications of the choice of welfare measures, if decisions
are based on the MaxiMin criterion. This means that the probability distribution over
the states of nature is not relevant here. Hence, the MaxiMin criterion can also be
used in the case of complete uncertainty. It is based on the assessment of the worst
case scenario. In this case the aggregation rule W is given by
W((zs)s) = min
s zs .
Hence, the ¯rst welfare measure takes the form:
W1(e) = min
s [U(e;s)] . (5)
The ex ante compensating variation is implicitely given by
min
s [U(e;s) ¡ CV (e)] = min
s [U(e
0;s)] .
Thus, we obtain for the second welfare concept:
W2(e) = min
s [U(e;s)] ¡ min
s [U(e
0;s)] . (6)
Finally we get for the ex post criterion:
W3(e) = min
s [U(e;s) ¡ U(e
0;s)] . (7)
Since the last term in (6) is una®ected by the choice of e, W1 and W2 di®er by a
constant only, and thus imply the same optimal decision. It remains to investigate the
di®erences between the optimal decisions based on W1 (W2) on the one hand and W3
on the other.
Let us ¯rst consider the welfare concept W1. Since we assumed that utility decreases
in s, we obtain
W1(e) = U(e;maxs) ,





2(e) = Ue(e;maxs) = 0 . (8)
The solution to this problem is denoted by em1, or em2 for the welfare measure W2,
respectively.
For the third welfare measure we have to analyze the ex post change in the utility level
U(e;s) ¡ U(e
0;s) .
Due to assumption (4) this di®erence decreases in s if e > e0, it is a increasing func-
tion of the damage parameter if e < e0.7 Therefore, the minimal (maximal) damage
parameter is decisive for the minimal ex post improvement of utility if a reduction





U(e;maxs) ¡ U(e0;maxs); for e ¸ e0
U(e;mins) ¡ U(e0;mins); for e < e0 .
The maximizing emission level we denote by em3. It is characterized by the following
conditions:
Ue(e












These conditions enable us to compare the emission level em3 with em1(= em2).
Proposition 4 The emissions based on the maximization of W3 exceed the optimal
emission level with respect to the other two criteria, i.e. em3 ¸ em1 = em2. The
optimal emission level em3 depends on the status quo emission level e0. It is given as
the emission level within the interval of possibly ex post optimal emission levels, that
requires the smallest policy change with respect to the status quo.
Applying the MaxiMin criterion, the decision maker bases his decisions exclusively on
the worst case. This is determined by the smallest ex post utility level if the ¯rst two
7See proof of proposition 2.
12welfare measures are applied. If, however, the third criterion is taken, the minimal
increase of utility is decisive. As a consequence, decisions based on W3 show a strong
aversion against a policy change. In ¯gure 2 it is illustrated how decisions depend on
the status quo level e0. The proof of proposition 4 is given in the appendix.
The properties of the welfare measure W3 which have been derived also imply potential
problems for calculating abatement costs or bene¯ts from the abatement of emissions
in order to ¯nd a decision. To illustrate this we again study the example, where U
is given as direct utility from emissions minus environmental damage, i.e. U(e;s) =
V (e;s) ¡ D(e;s).
Example 1 Let D(e,s)=d(e) be independent of s. Then argmins U(e;s) =
argminsV (e;s) on the one hand, whereas argmins[U(e;s) ¡ U(e0;s)] =
argmaxs[V (e0;s) ¡ V (e;s)] on the other. If assumption (4) holds, then a state of
nature s with a high ex post utility level also implies high abatement cost. Hence, the
\worst case" depends on the choice of the welfare measure: For W1, W2 it is given by
the lowest utility level (corresponding to the lowest abatement costs), whereas for W3
the \worst case" is given by the highest abatement costs (corresponding to the highest
utility level).
Example 2 Let V (e;s) = v(e) be independent of s. Then we obtain argmins U(e;s) =
argmaxs D(e;s) and argmins[U(e;s) ¡ U(e0;s)] = argmins[D(e0;s) ¡ D(e;s)]. Un-
der assumption (4) a high environmental damage corresponds to high bene¯ts form
abatement. As the \worst case" by applying W1 or W2 would result the maximal envi-
ronmental damage. If the welfare measure W3 is taken, the minimal gain from reducing
emissions is \worst", which corresponds to the minimal environmental damage.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed how optimal decisions under environmental uncertainty
depend on the choice of the welfare measure. Within a simple static model we studied
three di®erent welfare concepts. The ¯rst one bases on ex ante utility, the second
13-
6



















Figure 2: Optimal emissions for a MaxMin criterion. (i) shows the set ex post utility
levels for the minimal and for the maximal damage parameter. em1 and em2 coincide
with emin. For the third welfare measure the optimal emission level depends on the
status quo. This is ilustrated in (ii)-(iv). (ii) illustrates the choice of em3 given a
status quo emission level below emin. Here W3 increases with e as long as e < emin.
In (iii), em3 = e0 holds, since changing the emission level from e0 would decrease
W3. In (iv) the status quo level e0 exceeds emax. To get the maximal welfare W3, e
has to be decreased to emax.
14one on ex ante compensating variation measures, the last one on an aggregation of ex
post utility changes. Thereby the concepts of abatement costs and of bene¯ts from
abatement can be embedded in the third measure since they compare the implications
of the reference scenario (status quo) and the intended emission level.
We have demonstrated that exclusively for risk-neutral decision makers the decisions
based on these welfare measures coincide. For all other decision criteria di®ernences
can arise. These were studied for risk aversion and the MaxiMin criterion. Decisions
based on the ¯rst two welfare measures di®er for risk-averse expected utility maximizer
with non constant absolute risk aversion, whereas they coincide for the MaxiMinimizer.
Decisions based on the third welfare concept, on the other hand, generally depart from
those obtained from the ¯rst two measures. For the probably mostly relevant case of
an optimal reduction of emissions we obtained the following result: A decision maker
who aggregates ex post utility changes, i.e. the bene¯ts from changing the policy from
the status quo, comes out with larger optimal emission levels than would be obtained
for the ¯rst two welfare concepts. The reason for this is that a state with a high utility
level generally corresponds to small bene¯ts from the policy change, and vice versa. So,
the higher the environmental damage, the more bene¯ts can be obtained from reducing
emissions. This case occurs because the utility in the status quo scenario does depend
on the state of nature.
Summarizing, optimal decisions of non-risk-neutral decision makers may heavily de-
pend on the underlying welfare functional. Hence, one has to be aware of the con-
sequences of the choice of the welfare functional on emission decisions. The question
arises whether there exists one natural welfare measure which should be applied. In
our model it seems to be preferable to base decisions directly on the (expected) utility
of the representative consumer since this imitates the decision which is desired by the
consumer himself. However, due to informational restrictions this may be complicated
or even impossible. In such a case it is certainly easier to assess utility changes of con-
sumers by analyzing the willingness-to-pay for a certain political action. Thus, there
are normative reasons in favor of the ¯rst welfare measure whereas practical consider-
ations may lead to the necessity to apply the second or the third one. In any case, a
thorough assessment is necessary to inquire which welfare concept is appropriate in a
15particular context.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 1:
Due to the continuity of preferences they can be represented by a continuous utility
function W(x). This can be de¯ned as x » W(x) ¢ (1;:::;1) because preferences are
monotone.8 Note, that W(®(1;:::;1)) = ®. Hence, if x » W(x) ¢ (1;:::;1), then for
arbitrary vectors y we get x + y » W(x) ¢ (1;:::;1) + y. It follows
W(x + y) = W(W(x) ¢ (1;:::;1) + y)
= W(y + W(x) ¢ (1;:::;1))
= W(W(y) ¢ (1;:::;1) + W(x) ¢ (1;:::;1))
= W((W(x) + W(y))¢¢¢(1;:::;1))
= W(x) + W(y) ,
and therefore W(z ¢ x) = zW(x) and W(
1
z ¢ x) =
1
zW(x) for all integers z. Let ® 2 IR
denote any real number. It can be approximated by
pn
qn ! ®, where pn;qn are integers.














Therefore W(¢) is linear and can be represented as W(x) = ¼ ¢ x, where ¼s ¸ 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1:
Assume that for all utility functions U(¢), W1 and W3 lead to identical decisions. Then
{ applying lemma 1 { the preference º de¯ned by x1 º x2 , W(x1) ¸ W(x2) can be
8A (standard) proof is given by MasColell et al. [1995], p. 47.






s. Hence W can be interpreted as risk
neutral expected utility.



























Thus, the \optimal" emission levels coincide. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2:
The risk neutral emission level e¤ is given by
R
Ue(e¤;s)d¼(s) = 0. The right hand sides
of (1)-(3) look similar, except for the di®erent weights Á0(¢) attached to the marginal
utility Ue2. Note that under our assumptions Ue(e;s) decreases in s. Hence, if the
weights Á0(¢) are an increasing function of s, smaller values of the marginal ex post
utility Ue(e¤;s) get larger weights. Thus, in this case we would obtain a negative value
for the right hand sides of (1)-(3) at e = e¤. Analogously, the right hand sides take
a positive value at e¤ if the weights are decreasing in the damage parameter. It is
easily seen that the weights in (1) and (2) are increasing in s. Hence it follows that
W0
1(e¤) < 0 and W0
2(e¤) < 0. Since W1 is concave and since W 00
2 (e) < 0 if W 0
2(e) = 0,
this directly implies claim (i).
If s < ¹ s, then our assumptions in (4) imply that [U(e;s) ¡ U(e; ¹ s)] increases in e.
Therefore we obtain:
U(e;s) ¡ U(e; ¹ s) ? U(e
0;s) ¡ U(e
0; ¹ s) and
U(e;s) ¡ U(e
0;s) ? U(e; ¹ s) ¡ U(e
0; ¹ s) for e ? e
0; s · ¹ s . (12)
Thus, the weight Á0(U(e;s) ¡ U(e0;s)) in (3) increases in s if e > e0 and decreases if
e < e0. Therefore, W 0
3(e¤) < 0 if e¤ > e0, and W 0
3(e¤) > 0 if e¤ < e0. This implies claim
(ii) since under our assumptions W 00
3(e) < 0. Q.E.D.
17Proof of proposition 3:
(i) To derive the relationship between e¤1 and e¤2 we consider the numerator of the
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Since utility and marginal utility are decreasing in s, the third factor in (13) is de-
creasing, the second one is increasing in s. If preferences obey DARA, the ¯rst factor
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Hence, as long as RHS(CV ) · 0 the derivative RHS0(CV ) < 0. Since RHS(0) = 0
this implies RHS(CV ) < 0 at CV (e¤2)(> 0). Since
R
Á0(U(e;s) ¡ CV )[Ue(e;s)]d¼(s)
decreases in e, it ¯nally follows that e¤2 < e¤1. Similarly, IARA leads to e¤2 > e¤1 and
for CARA one arrives at e¤2 = e¤1.
(ii) To show the relation between e¤3 and e¤1 (e¤2) for e0 > e¤1 (e0 > e¤2) it su±ces
to show that W 0
3(e¤1) > 0 ( W 0
3(e¤2) > 0 ). We consider the relation for e¤1. Let ¹ s be


















































Á0(U(e¤1; ¹ s) ¡ U(e0;¹ s))










Analogously one can show that W 0
3(e¤2) > 0 for e¤2 < e0. If on the other hand an
expansion of emissions is optimal (e¤1;e¤2 > e0), then the ¯rst inequality changes into
\<", implying an ambiguous sign of W0
3(e¤1) (W 0
3(e¤1)). Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4:
Let emin = em1 = em2 be de¯ned as Ue(emin;maxs) = 0 and emax as Ue(emax;mins) =
0. Note that if e0 < emin, then Ue(e0;mins) > Ue(e0;maxs) > 0 holds. Hence, it is
optimal to raise the emission level and from (9) we obtain Ue(em3;maxs) = 0 which
implies em3 = emin. On the other hand, e0 > emax analogously leads to em3 = emax.
Finally, if emin · e0 · emax, it follows that Ue(e0;maxs) · 0 · Ue(e0;mins). Thus,
any change of the emission level would reduce W3. Hence, we obtain em3 = e0 as
the optimal emission level. Summarizing, if e0 is outside the interval [emin;emax], the
optimal emission level coincides with the closest boundary of the interval. If e0 lies in
the interval, then policy is not changed (em3 = e0). Note that since em1 = em2 = emin,
the emission level resulting from the W3 measure is not smaller than em1 = em2.
Q.E.D.
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